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THE NEED FOR A DUAL APPROACH
TO ENTRAPMENT
There are a number of crimes for which undercover police involve-
ment is the only practical method for both detecting specific instances
of the crime and gathering evidence to prosecute the offenders.' As a
result, police2 involvement has included the use of traps and informers3
to afford would-be offenders the opportunities or facilities needed for
the commission of the crimes.4 The fact that the police afford such
opportunities or facilities ordinarily is not a defense to the prosecution,5
but when the criminal conduct becomes the product of the creative ac-
tivity of the police, entrapment becomes an affirmative defense.6
Courts use various legal theories to explain the entrapment defense.7
1. Certain types of criminal activity are consensual and covert. Hence they are virtu-
ally undetectable without the use of a government agent or an informer. Narcotics ped-
dlers, brokers of counterfeit currency, transporters of prostitutes across state lines, and
gamblers employing interstate facilities to transmit bets all do business clandestinely.
Their victims are willing, sometimes eager, accomplices. Their crimes are likely to go
unchecked unless the government can itself approach a suspect to offer him the opportu-
nity to commit a crime and thus give evidence of his guilt.
Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960 (1969). See gener-
ally L. TiFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CrME 273 (1967); Donnelly,
Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091
(1951); Rotenberg, The Police Detection Practice of Encouragement, 49 VA. L. REV. 871 (1963).
2. Police will be used in this Note to refer to government agents (including such local, state
or federal officials as police and FBI or Drug Enforcement Agency agents) or persons working for
government agents (e.g., informers).
3. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453-54 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring in the
result). Government involvement is often bizarre. See, e.g., United States v. Smalls, 363 F.2d 417
(2d Cir. 1966) (defendant had known informer for many years and informer's mother helped to
rear him); United States ex rel. Toler v. Pate, 332 F.2d 425 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 858
(1964) (more than twenty solicitations for narcotics); Guarro v. United States, 237 F.2d 578 (D.C.
Cir. 1956) (plainclothes policemen offering themselves as bait for homosexuals); People v. Isaac-
son, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978) (police beat up a suspect to force him
to become an informant and then had him arrange a drug pickup at a point in New York that was
physically similar to Pennsylvania so that the defendant would believe the transaction was in
Pennsylvania).
4. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441 (1932).
5. Id.
6. In this Note, entrapment indicates cases in which the defendant has raised the entrap-
ment defense. Entrapment serves as a complete defense against conviction. The accused, who has
performed the act constituting the crime, nevertheless is set free on the theory that he is an other-
wise innocent person who is being punished for an offense that was the creation of the govern-
ment. 287 U.S. at 451.
7. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433, 435 (1973) (legislative intent); Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts, J., concurring) (protect purity of judicial proc-
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Currently, there are two views of entrapments-a subjective view that
has always attracted a majority of the Supreme Court and most state
courts,8 and an objective view that has always had minority support in
the Court and a few state courts.9 The subjective view focuses on the
intent or predisposition of the defendant.' 0 Predisposition exists when
the defendant intends to commit the crime irrespective of police con-
duct." If the police induced the defendant to commit the offense by
ess); Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672, 674 (9th Cir. 1957) (constitutional due process); United
States v. Lemons, 200 F.2d 396, 397 (7th Cir. 1952) (estoppel); Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F.
412, 415 (9th Cir. 1915) (public policy).
8. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S.
423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932); State v. Keating, 551 S.W.2d 589 (Mo. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1071 (1978); People v.
Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511,378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978); State v. Knight, 230 S.E.2d 732
(W. Va. 1976).
9. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,436 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 441
(Stewart, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 455 (1932) (Roberts,
J., concurring); Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969); State v. McKinney, 108 Ariz. 436,
501 P.2d 378 (1972); State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974); People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7,
210 N.W.2d 336 (1973); State v. Talbot, 71 NJ. 160, 364 A.2d 9 (1976); Lynn v. State, 505 P.2d
1337 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); State v. Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979); Wood v. Common-
wealth, 213 Va. 363, 192 S.E.2d 762 (1972).
The test for the objective view of entrapment usually refers to police conduct that would induce
a hypothetical person to commit the offense charged. This is also the view that the Model Penal
Code has adopted:
(1) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an
official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the com-
mission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct
constituting such offense by either:.
(a) Making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such
conduct is not prohibited; or
(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial
risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are
ready to commit it.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
10. The Supreme Court has never comprehensively defined predisposition. One court has
stated that predisposition "connotes only a general intent or purpose to commit the crime when an
opportunity or facility is afforded for the commission thereof," rather than an intent to commit a
specific crime involving a specific victim at a specific time and place. State v. Houpt, 210 Kan.
778, 782, 504 P.2d 570, 574 (1972). One commentator has stated that a more careful consideration
of two additional questions is also required.
1. How much must the offense that the subject is predisposed to commit resemble the
offense that he is offered the opportunity to commit; and
2. How likely must it be that, if not offered the opportunity, the subject would in fact
commit the offense that he is disposed to commit.
Dix, Undercover Investigations and Police Rulemaking, 53 TEX. L. REv. 203, 254-55 (1975).
11. The subjective view is an offshoot of the notion that "Congress could not have intended
criminal punishment for a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense,
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implanting a disposition to commit the crime in the mind of an inno-
cent person, however, the entrapment defense will succeed. 2 The ob-
jective view focuses on the police conduct itself. Entrapment exists
when police conduct would induce a reasonable person to commit a
crime. The issue is thus whether the police used an improper induce-
ment; 13 if so, the defendant will be acquitted.
At trial the real difference between the subjective and objective ap-
proaches to entrapment is in the admissibility of certain types of evi-
dence. 4 In a typical entrapment case the prosecution presents its case-
in-chief, generally by detailing the illegal actions and the role the de-
fendant played. In the defense case-in-chief, the defendant then raises
the entrapment defense by showing the police used persuasion or in-
ducement that caused the defendant to commit the illegal acts. 15 To
raise the defense, the defendant has the initial burden of going forward
with some evidence that the police induced him to commit the of-
fense.' 6 The prosecution must rebut the defendant's evidence of en-
trapment beyond a reasonable doubt. This rebuttal evidence takes the
form of proving the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime be-
yond a reasonable doubt.1 7
The crucial difference between the two approaches is in the admissi-
but was induced to commit them by the government." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435
(1973). The general view is that there is a missing element of the crime in entrapment cases. The
defendant has committed the acts constituting the crime, but the criminal intent needed for the
offense is missing because of the police inducements. See People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 199, 205,
282 N.E.2d 322, 325, 331 N.Y.S.2d 430, 435 (1972). See aLso note 121 infra.
12. 287 U.S. at 442.
13. Different formulae can determine the propriety of the police inducement. The Model
Penal Code has adopted the view that an inducement is illegal if it creates "a substantial risk that
... an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit." MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.13(1) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). One state court has stated that an induce-
ment is improper if it "would be effective to persuade an average person" to commit the crime.
Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969).
14. See notes 18-23 infra and accompanying text.
15. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text.
16. See United States v. Woflts, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Timberlake, 559
F.2d 1375 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Bailey, 503 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1974). Accord, United
States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1979); United States v.
Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1977); State v. Ford, - Minn. _ 276 N.W.2d 178 (1979).
In the objective approach to entrapment the defendant carries the burden of establishing the
defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Coffey v. State, 585 P.2d 514 (Alaska 1978); Batson
v. State, 563 P.2d 973 (Alaska 1977).
17. See United States v. Glaeser, 550 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Hermosillo-
Nanez, 545 F.2d 1230 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1050 (1977); People v. Walker, 61 Ill.
Washington University Open Scholarship
202 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 59:199
bility of rebuttal testimony. Under the subjective approach the rebuttal
evidence must prove the defendant's already-formed intent to commit
the crime or similar crimes and his willingness to commit them. 18
Types of admissible evidence include evidence of past criminal con-
duct,19 not necessarily limited to felonies,20 convictions, 21 or criminal
reputation. 22 Under the objective approach, however, such rebuttal ev-
idence is immaterial and thus properly excludable from the trial2 3 be-
cause the focus is on the police conduct.
Despite this difference in focus, both views share a basic concern for
governmental intrusion into the lives of innocent people to induce
criminal acts. Neither view recognizes a constitutional basis for the de-
fense.2 4 Some courts, however, have used the concept of due process as
a basis for the entrapment defense,25 and the Supreme Court has indi-
cated that due process is available as a non-entrapment defense when
App. 3d 4, 377 N.E.2d 604 (1978); State v. Sherburne, 366 A.2d 1127 (Me. 1976); State v. Ford, _
Minn. ._, 276 N.W.2d 178 (1979).
The view that predisposition is a proper inquiry to rebut the police conduct in inducing the
defendant to commit the criminal acts was outlined in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435
(1932), in which the Court held that predisposition can properly rebut the defendant's claim of
improper police conduct. Sherman reiterated this view. "On the one hand, at trial the accused
may examine the conduct of the government agent; and on the other hand, the accused will be
subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition' as
bearing on his claim of innocence." 356 U.S. at 373 (quoting Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 451 (1932)).
18. United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1008 (2d Cir. 1933).
19. Sullivan v. United States, 219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
20. Carlton v. United States, 198 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1952).
21. Sullivan v. United States, 219 F.2d 760 (D.C. Cir. 1955); United States v. Perkins, 190
F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1951).
22. Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 1103 (1969);
Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960); United States v. Valdes, 229 F.2d 145
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 996 (1956).
23. Because the objective focus is on the police conduct, any evidence relating to the defend-
ant's past criminal conduct or reputation would have no bearing on the material facts in issue.
The rebuttal evidence admissible under the subjective approach would be at best superfluous and
at worst misleading to the trier of fact who would be focusing solely on the police conduct.
24. Some courts and commentators argue that entrapment should have a constitutional basis.
See, ag., Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Chisum, 312 F.
Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Note, The Defense of Entrapment: A Plea for Consitutional Stan.
dards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63 (1967).
25. See United States v. Russell, 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), revd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973);
Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957); United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307
(C.D. Cal. 1970). The Supreme Court specifically rejected a constitutional basis for entrapment in
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973).
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police conduct is sufficiently outrageous. 26 Part I of this Note will ex-
amine the role of due process in entrapment cases and its role after the
Supreme Court decisions in United States v. Russell27 and Hampton v.
United States.28 Part II will analyze how courts have applied the due
process defense and the standards that have developed to guide courts
in its application. Finally, part III will suggest the necessity for a dual
focus to entrapment cases and propose some standards with which to
evaluate police conduct.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
The Supreme Court first recognized the entrapment defense in Sor-
rells v. United States,29 indicating that the defense derived from a con-
gressional intent implicit in criminal statutes not to find an otherwise-
innocent person guilty when the offense was the product of the creative
activity of the government.30 The defense was unavailable, however, if
the defendant had a predisposition to commit the crime and was
merely availing himself of the opportunity provided by the government
agent." Following Sorrells, lower federal courts, with only two excep-
26. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431 (1973).
27. 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
28. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
29. 287 U.S. 435 (1932). The first reported state cases recognizing the entrapment defense
were Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218 (1878) and O'Brien v. State, 6 Tex. App. 665 (1879). The
first reported federal case recognizing an entrapment defense was Woo Wal v. United States, 223
F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915).
30. We are unable to conclude that it was the intention of the Congress in enacting this
statute that its process of detection and enforcement should be abused by the instigation
by government officials of an act on the part of persons otherwise innocent in order to
lure them to its commission and to punish them. We are not forced by the letter to do
violence to the spirit and purpose of the statute.
287 U.S. at 448.
31. The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant.... [T]he
defendant [who] seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment... cannot complain of an
appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing
upon that issue. If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has brought it upon
himself by reason of the nature of the defense.
Id. at 451-52. Justice Roberts, in a separate concurring opinion in which Justices Stone and Bran-
deis joined, opted for a completely different approach to entrapment while concurring in the re-
sult. For Justice Roberts an objective approach focusing on the propriety of the government
conduct (id. at 458-59) was the proper focus of entrapment cases. The Court's function was to
preserve the purity of government and the administration of justice. Id. at 457. The defendant's
predisposition of the type of offense charged should have no bearing on the Court's disposition of
the entrapment defense. Id. at 455.
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tions,32 adhered to the majority view that the defendant's predispo-
sition is determinative 'for the entrapment defense."3 In 1958 the
Supreme Court in Sherman v. United States again faced an entrapment
case, but the Court simply reiterated the majority position in Sorrells
and specifically refused to reconsider the doctrinal underpinnings of
the entrapment defense.34
Although paying lip service to the majority view that the focus in
entrapment cases is on the predisposition of the defendant, a number of
post-Sherman federal cases instead focused on police conduct.35 Vari-
ous legal theories underlay this shift in focus, 3 6 but potentially the most
far-reaching was the use of due process standards as a constitutional
32. See Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957); Wall v. United States, 65 F.2d
993 (5th Cir. 1933).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Ginsburg, 96 F.2d 882 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 620
(1938); Burke v. United States, 84 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1936); Bonnoyer v. United States, 63 F.2d 93
(1st Cir. 1933); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933).
34. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). Appellant, while undergoing treatment
for narcotics addiction, met a fellow narcotics patient who was also a government informer. The
informer repeatedly asked the appellant to help him obtain drugs for his own use. After some
initial reluctance, the appellant obtained drugs for the informer and eventually was convicted for
illegally selling narcotics. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction finding that the appellant
had been entrapped as a matter of law because he was not predisposed to commit the crime. In
regard to the policies underlying the entrapment defense the Court said:
It has been suggested that in overturning this conviction we should reassess the doc-
trine of entrapment according to principles announced in the separate opinion of Mr.
Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. UnitedStates. . . . To do so would be to decide the case on
grounds rejected by the majority in Sorrells and.. . not raised here or below by the
parties before us.
Id. at 376 (citation omitted).
35. See, e.g., Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bueno,
447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973); United States v. Arceneaux, 437
F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. Morrison, 348 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1965); Williamson v.
United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962); Banks v. United States, 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957);
United States v. Chisum, 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
The courts felt that the government activity had exceeded permissible bounds in these cases,
and the entrapment defense, with its subjective focus on the defendant, did not allow for adequate
supervision of the police. In Greene the court stated that, "we do not believe the Government may
involve itself so directly and continuously over such a long period of time in the creation and
maintenance of criminal operations, and yet prosecute its collaborators." Greene v. United States,
454 F.2d 783, 787 (9th Cir. 1971).
36. See Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971) (overreaching government
conduct); Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962) (contingent fee arrangement




basis for entrapment. 37 Banks v. United States, 3 8 decided prior to Sher-
man, was the first case to explicitly rest entrapment on fifth amendment
due process grounds. In Banks a government agent gave the defendant
money to buy narcotics, and the court found that the government offi-
cials had instigated the illegal conduct.39 The Ninth Circuit, without
any discussion, stated that obtaining a conviction in this manner vio-
lated the due process provision of the fifth amendment.4'
In United States v. Chisum4' the government agents supplied the con-
traband with which to convict defendants. The court examined various
rationales for the entrapment defense and found entrapment as a mat-
ter of law by comparing the police conduct with due process stan-
dards.42 Chisum relied on Cox v. Louisiana43 and Raley v. Ohio,' two
Supreme Court cases in which the government agent had specifically
authorized the accused to act and then had arrested him for those
acts.45 The Supreme Court found that the entrapment in Cox and
37. A constitutional basis for entrapment would make the defense mandatory upon the
states, although all states now recognize the defense in one of its forms. In addition, premising
entrapment on due process grounds would yield a "more consistent and just delineation of the line
between permissible police participation in crime and improper tactics which violate personal
integrity." Note, The Defense of Entrapment: .4 Plea for Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L.
REV. 63, 66 (1967).
38. 249 F.2d 672 (9th Cir. 1957).
39. Id. at 674.
40. Id. The defendant made a motion to dismiss because he had been entrapped by govern-
ment agents and thus could not be prosecuted. The trial court denied the motion and he was
convicted, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded because of their finding that the de-
fendant's due process rights had been violated. On remand, the defendant made a motion to
vacate his conviction, which was again denied, and this time the court of appeals affirmed the
denial of the motion and thus apparently reversed itself as to the due process claim at 258 F.2d
318 (1958). The Supreme Court denied certiorari at 358 U.S. 886 (1958).
41. 312 F. Supp. 1307 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
42. Were the courts to sanction the law enforcement activities committed in this case, it
would transform the laws designed to promote the general welfare into a technique
aimed at manufacturing disobedience in order to punish, a concept thoroughly repug-
nant to constitutional principles. When the government supplies the contraband, the
receipt of which is illegal, the government cannot be permitted to punish the one receiv-
ing it. To permit the government to do so would be to countenance violations ofjustice.
Id. at 1312. In this case Chisum, the defendant, approached Metzger, whom the police had previ-
ously charged with dealing in counterfeit money, and offered to buy his counterfeit bills. Metzger
told the police about this, they gave him some of the money, and he sold it to Chisum. Chisum
was then arrested for receiving counterfeit bills with intent to sell. Id. at 1308-09. The court noted
that the intent to commit the crime had originated with Chisum and thus that he was predisposed,
but dismissed the charge on both entrapment and due process grounds, which the court found
were "indistinguishable." Id. at 1310-12.
43. 379 U.S. 559 (1965).
44. 360 U.S. 423 (1959).
45. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965); Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, 437-39 (1959).
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Raley violated due process.'
The final case using due process as the basis for the entrapment de-
fense was United States v. Russell.47 The Russell court convicted de-
fendant of manufacturing narcotics after the government agent had
supplied a necessary ingredient for their manufacture.48 Russell, the
defendant, conceded a predisposition to commit the offense,49 but ar-
gued that the degree of governmental participation in the manufacture
of the narcotics should bar the prosecution." The Ninth Circuit
agreed, recognizing that such governmental conduct was intolerable
because it violated fundamental concepts of due process "and evince[d]
the reluctance of the judiciary to countenance 'overzealous law enforce-
ment .... 2 "51
On appeal, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the idea that en-
trapment rests on a constitutional basis.52 Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the five member majority,53 found that predisposition to commit the
crime was fatal to Russell's entrapment defense.54 Justice Rehnquist,
however, did not completely shut the door on any due process aspect to
46. Cox and Raley differ from the standard entrapment situation in which the government
agents afford the accused the opportunity to perform acts that he knows are illegal. In neither
Cox nor Raley did the defendants attempt to establish an entrapment defense and in this sense
they are not really entrapment cases. Instead, they are cases in which the Supreme Court on its
own initiative decided that the defendants had been entrapped because they had obeyed govern-
ment officials whom they had reason to believe were authorized to tell them what to do and were
then arrested for doing what they had been told to do. In Cox the police gave the defendants
permission to picket where they did. To then convict the defendants for picketing would be an
improper form of entrapment for which "It]he Due Process Clause does not permit convictions."
379 U.S. 559, 571 (1965). InRaley the defendants were convicted for exercising a privilege against
self-incrimination they had been led to believe was available to them. The Supreme Court held
that this constituted "an indefensible sort of entrapment" that violated the due process clause. 360
U.S. 423, 425, 426 (1959).
47. 459 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
48. In Russell a government agent supplied the defendant with phenyl-2-propanone, a chem-
ical necessary for the production of methamphetamine (speed) and difficult, but not impossible, to
obtain legally. The agent took part in the manufacture of the drug and also purchased a small
amount from the defendant. Subsequently, the defendant was charged and convicted for the man-
ufacture, delivery, and sale of methamphetamine.
49. 411 U.S. at 427.
50. 459 F.2d at 673.
51. Id. at 674 (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 381 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in result)).
52. 411 U.S. at 433.
53. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell joined to form the major-
ity.
54. 411 U.S. at 436.
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entrapment cases.55 He held open the possibility that in a proper case
of sufficiently outrageous government conduct, such conduct could bar
prosecution even when the defendant was predisposed to commit the
crime.56 Neither of the two dissents addressed the defendant's due
process claim. 7 The dissenting Justices merely reiterated the noncon-
stitutional, objective view of entrapment.
Because Russell indicated that the Court would recognize some po-
lice conduct as exceeding the bounds of due process, defendants quick-
ly seized upon this new defense-but with little success.58 Just three
years after Russell, however, the Court put this due process claim to the
test in Hampton v. United States.5 9 In Hampton a government agent
supplied the heroin that other government agents subsequently
55. Predisposition of the defendant remained the focus of the entrapment defense, id. at 433,
with the new due process rationale available as a non-entrapment defense when there was suffi-
ciently outrageous police conduct, id. at 431-32.
56. While we may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of law
enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction, cf Rochin v. Cali-
fornia ... the instant case is distinctly not of that breed.
411 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted).
57. Justice Douglas wrote one dissent in which Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 436. Justice
Stewart wrote the other dissent in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined. Id. at 439.
58. Compare United States v. Smith, 538 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1976) (limited government in-
volvement in drug manufacturing does not violate due process); United States v. Quintana, 508
F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1975) (government agents posing as mobsters and selling drugs does not violate
due process) and United States v. Spivey, 508 F.2d 146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949
(1975) (government agent distributing marijuana to "set up" defendant does not violate due proc-
ess) and United States v. Lue, 498 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975)
(government supply of drug couriers does not violate due process) and United States v. Hopkin-
son, 492 F.2d 1041 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974) (government agent accompanying
and paying travel expenses of unindicted co-conspirator in order to observe drug purchase does
not violate due process) and United States v. Greenbank, 491 F.2d 184 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 950 (1974) (government agent acting as carrier of contraband for defendants does not violate
due process) and United States v. McGrath, 468 F.2d 1027 (7th Cir. 1972), vacated in light of
Russell, 412 U.S. 936 (1973), conviction afl'd, 494 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1974) (government involve-
ment in ongoing counterfeit operation does not violate due process) with United States v. Archer,
486 F.2d 670 (2d Cir. 1973) (In Archer the Government, believing there was corruption in the
district attorney's office, authorized some agents to carry pistols and then arrested them for unau-
thorized possession of two loaded pistols (a felony in New York). The agents then let it be known
that they were willing to pay to avoid a trial or conviction to see the reaction of members of the
district attorney's office. The court found that the government agents had "displayed an arrogant
disregard for the sanctity of the state judicial and police processes by permitting their fabrications
to involve police, courts and members of the grand jury." 486 F.2d at 677. Although the court
condemned this government activity in dicta, it decided the case on other grounds.).
59. 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
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purchased from the defendant.6" The defendant was convicted of dis-
tributing heroin and on appeal sought reversal of his conviction on due
process grounds.6'
Justice Rehnquist wrote a plurality opinion in which he apparently
reversed his stand in Russell and rejected the due process claim for a
predisposed defendant.62 For Justice Rehnquist, the only remedy
available to criminal defendants with respect to the acts of government
agents is the defense of entrapment. 63  The only circumstances that
would allow the defendant to avail himself of the due process defense
would be those in which the government activity in question violates
one of the defendant's rights.64 In any other situation in which the po-
lice and the defendant act together in some illegal manner "the remedy
lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting
the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law.
' 6 "
A majority of the Court rejected this attempt to erase the due process
language of Russell. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion con-
cluded that Russell controlled the case. 66 He stated that the plurality
opinion went too far in denying that due process considerations could
ever bar the prosecution of a predisposed defendant.67  Given suffi-
ciently outrageous police conduct, Justice Powell would allow the de-
fendant to assert a due process claim irrespective of his
60. Id. at 485-87.
61. Id. at 485, 489.
62. Id. at 485-91. Chief Justice Burger and Justice White joined in this opinion. Justice
Rehnquist found that the defendant's admission of predisposition was dispositive on the entrap-
ment issue, id. at 489, thus reaffirming the majority focus in entrapment cases in Sorrells, Sher-
man, and Russell. Justice Rehnquist's stand on the due process issue is not entirely clear. He
states that Hampton is consistent with Russell because in both cases the government was acting in
concert with the defendant. Id. at 489. However, the cases are inconsistent because in Hampton
Justice Rehnquist states that the only remedy for a criminal defendant who acts in conjunction
with the police is the defense of entrapment. The due process claim that Russell would allow
under the appropriate circumstances is no longer avialable. Id. at 490. Justice Rehnquist then
does a reversal of his thinking by indicating that a due process defense would be available if the
police conduct violated some protected right of the defendant. Id. After this "peek-a-boo" stance
on the availability of a due process defense, it is difficult to tell exactly where Justice Rehnquist
stands on this issue.
63. Id. at 490.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 495. Justice Blackmun joined in this concurrence.




predisposition.68 The three dissenting Justices69 reaffirmed the objec-
tive approach to entrapment, focusing on whether the police conduct
fell below the standards for legitimate police practices." In addition
the dissent, unlike in Russell, stated that they would apply due process
standards in entrapment cases for sufficiently offensive law enforce-
ment activities.7 '
Because of the Court's split in Hampton, entrapment law is in a state
of confusion. Five Justices still adhere to the subjective approach to
entrapment,72 but five Justices also recognize a non-entrapment due
process defense that, because of its focus on police conduct, is very sim-
ilar to the objective approach to entrapment. 73 The Justices who recog-
nize the due process defense are further split into two groups. One
group 74 would recognize a limited due process defense triggered by
"police overinvolvement in crime that would have to reach a demon-
strable level of outrageousness before it could bar conviction. ' 75 The
other group 76 would apparently find a due process violation under cir-
cumstances of significantly less police involvement in crime.7 7
68. Justice Powell recognized that significant problems may arise in trying to develop stan-
dards for applying the due process claim. Id. at 491 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165,
173 (1952)). Justice Powell also indicated there would not be many cases in which a due process
defense would be successful. Id. at 495 n.7. He indicated, however, that these difficulties do not
justify the plurality's absolute rule:
Due process in essence means fundamental fairness, and the Court's cases are replete
with examples ofjudgments as to when such fairness has been denied an accused in light
of all the circumstances .... The fact that there is sometimes no sharply defined stan-
dard against which to make these judgments is not itself a sufficient reason to deny the
federal judiciary's power to make them when warranted by the circumstances.
Id. at 494-95 n.6 (citations omitted).
69. Id. at 495-500. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stewart
and Marshall. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration of the case.
70. Id. at 496-97.
71. Id. at 497.
72. These five are Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, White, Powell, and Black-
mun.
73. These five are Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart, Powell, and Blackmun.
74. Justices Powell and Blackmun comprised the concurrence in Hampton. See note 68
supra and accompanying text.
75. 425 U.S. at 495 n.7.
76. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stewart comprised the dissent in Hampton. See text
accompanying note 71 supra.
77. Hampton indicates the differences in the level of police conduct acceptable to each group.
Justice Powell found that government supply of contraband to one later convicted of selling that
heroin to other government agents was not sufficiently outrageous police conduct to invoke the
fundamental fairness notions of due process. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, would find, at a
minimum, that a conviction is barred when the crime charged is the sale of contraband which the
government supplied to the defendant. 425 U.S. at 500.
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II. AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Since Hampton, a dual focus to entrapment cases has existed. One
focus is on the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crane
charged,78 and the other focus is on the outrageousness of the police
conduct measured by due process standards. 79 These two foci are theo-
retically independent of each other: The former is part of the entrap-
ment doctrine while the latter is a non-entrapment defense that has
been mentioned in some entrapment cases. Both approaches, however,
deal with the same general circumstances-a defendant who alleges
that the police entrapped him by inducing him to engage in illegal ac-
tivity. The type of conduct in which the police can engage while deal-
ing with potential criminals is a matter of concern to all the parties
involved. 0 Therefore it would be reasonable to expect the Supreme
Court to develop standards to determine the level of outrageous police
conduct that will satisfy the due process defense and to delineate situa-
tions in which due process would be an available defense."'
Because the Supreme Court has failed to do this, however, lower fed-
eral courts and state courts are extremely reluctant to utilize the due
process defense.8 2 Courts generally dismiss defendants asserting the
defense with only a cursory statement that the defense exists, but that
the police conduct in the case falls short of the outrageousness neces-
sary to make it available to the particular defendant.8 3
In Russell 4 and again in Hampton 5 the Justices allowing the due
process defense cited Rochin v. California6 as an example of the type of
law enforcement conduct that was impermissible. Rochin is the infa-
mous stomach pump case. After observing the defendant swallow mor-
phine capsules, the police transported him to the hospital where his
78. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
79. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
80. The vast majority of entrapment cases deal with drug-related crime-the manufacture,
sale, distribution, or possession of narcotics.
81. Although the Court could reasonably develop the standards, the present split in the Court
over the types of police conduct that would reach the level of "outrageousness" makes the devel-
opment of standards both difficult and somewhat unlikely. See note 77 supra and accompanying
text.
82. See note 103 infra and accompanying text.
83. Id.
84. 411 U.S. at 431-32.
85. 425 U.S. at 494-95 n.6.




stomach was pumped against his will to retrieve the morphine.87 The
Supreme Court used the due process provision of the fourteenth
amendment to disallow this police conduct. The language the Court
used to describe due process illustrates the problem of developing stan-
dards for due process in entrapment cases. The Court saw the due
process clause as guaranteeing rights that "are 'so rooted in the tradi-
tion and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.' "88
The police must confine themselves to conduct exhibiting "a commu-
nity sense of fair play and decency"89 that does not "brutalize the tem-
per of society."'  Pumping the defendant's stomach, however, was
"conduct that shock[ed] the conscience." 91
The problem with these alleged standards is that they are really sub-
jective judgments that are too general to serve as manageable standards
against which to measure specific police conduct.9 2 These vague no-
tions gloss over the very real problem of the need for clarity in defining
the limits of permissible police conduct. Rochin acknowledged that
subjective judgments are inadequate bases for determining proper po-
lice conduct: "In each case 'due process of law' requires an evaluation
based on a disinterested inquiry pursued in the spirit of science, on a
balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached con-
sideration of conflicting claims." 93
Defendants, courts, and police all probably would prefer more spe-
cific standards for "outrageous" law enforcement conduct. Such stan-
dards would aid defendants in preparing their cases and in arguing that
the police conduct was excessive.94 Courts would have definite criteria
87. The police forced their way into the defendant's bedroom without a warrant and then
brought him to the hospital against his will. If the case had been in federal court the warrantless
search and seizure would have prevented using evidence obtained in this manner. See Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
88. 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
89. Id. at 173.
90. Id. at 174.
91. Id.
92. "Subjective" means that a particular judge will use his own notions of what type of police
conduct will fall within the conduct proscribed by the due process clause. This use of "subjective"
is different from the Court's use of subjective in its split between a subjective and objective focus
for entrapment cases. Subjective in the latter context refers to the predisposition of the defendant
to commit the crime charged. The Court in Aursell recognized the problem ofjudges determining
permissible police conduct when it stressed the fact that the objective focus of entrapment would
give courts a" 'chancellors' foot" veto over unacceptable police conduct. 411 U.S. at 434-35.
93. 342 U.S. at 172.
94. In federal cases after Hampton, defendants raising the due process defense have had only
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against which to measure the alleged objectionable police conduct and
would not have to merely restate the vague pronouncements the
Supreme Court uses in describing due process. Police would know how
far they could go in their relationship with potential criminals before
they cross the line into outrageous conduct.
Underlying this need for standards are broad and sometimes con-
flicting policies concerning the proper scope of police involvement in
crime, the rights of defendants, and the societal desire for a safe envi-
ronment in which to live.95 Although there has always been a societal
aversion to undercover police investigations,96 the increase in drug use
and the concomitant rise in drug-related crimes have made police un-
dercover drug investigations necessary to safeguard society. 9 7  In
Hampton the Supreme Court noted the difficulty of detecting contra-
band offenses without undercover investigations and the many
problems the police face in dealing with narcotic trafficking.98
Society, however, also recognizes interests in both personal privacy
and interpersonal relations upon which undercover investigations can
infringe. The extent to which society is willing to allow limited in-
fringement of these interests for the sake of an environment freer of
crime cannot be determined with mathematical precision.99 It is possi-
ble, however, to identify the types of crimes in the investigation of
which police should be allowed greater leeway. 1°°
Rochin as an example of sufficiently outrageous police conduct. Because most cases are more
ambiguous than Rochin in the type of police conduct that is involved, standards are necessary to
help delineate when police conduct is outrageous in given circumstances.
95. An extensive discussion of these policy goals is beyond the scope of this Note. For a
detailed exposition of the various types of police conduct involved in entrapment cases and their
effect on both society at large and individual defendants, see Dix, supra note 10.
96. See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 1, at 1091; Note, Judicial Control of Secret Agents, 76
YALE LJ. 994 (1967).
97. Narcotic sales generally occur between consenting parties. Because this is a victimless
crime, there is no one to come forward to make a complaint or give evidence. Consequently,
police often have no other option besides undercover investigations or the use of informers to get
evidence of narcotic trafficking. See note I supra and accompanying text.
98. 425 U.S. at 494-95 n.6.
99. For a discussion of the idea of balancing the rights of the defendant against society's need
for criminal procedures which will adequately protect the public, see D. FELLMAN, THE DEFEND-
ANT'S Rimrrs TODAY (1976); Packer, Two Models ofthe Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1
(1964).
100. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 (1942), re'd on other grounds, Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), where the Supreme Court recognized that different situations would
allow for varying degrees of court protection. The Court stated that an asserted denial of the




One criterion in identifying these crimes is the degree of danger the
criminals pose to society. Both the type of offense and the likelihood
that the criminal design could be put into effect bear on the degree of
danger. Thus, the more serious the crime and the more likely the per-
petrators will accomplish their goal, the more leeway the police should
have. 01 Another criterion is the necessity for police involvement in
crimes. As the Court noted in Hampton, the nature of contraband of-
fenses necessitates undercover police investigations to effectively deal
with them. 102
The New York Court of Appeals has attempted to define standards
for police conduct using the due process aspect of entrapment cases.t13
That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the uni-
versal sense ofjustice, may, in other circumstances, and the light of other considerations, fall short
of such denial." Id. at 462.
101. The criteria mentioned here are, of course, general. Classifying crimes as more or less
dangerous to society or determining how likely it is that a criminal design can be effected are
judgments that the courts (during litigation) or the police (when deciding what action they will
take against potential criminals) must make according to the facts in a given situation.
One example of how crimes might be classified according to their danger to society would be
the various narcotics violations. A person whose crime is possession of marijuana generally would
seem to pose little threat to others. The manufacture of speed, however, is a more serious crime
because of the potential that speed has for reaching many users and involving many more people
than the single person possessing marijuana. Because of the greater severity of the crime of manu-
facturing speed, the police should have more leeway in the types of permissible conduct in their
investigation than if they were investigating a single marijuana possession.
102. 425 U.S. at 495 n.7 (Powell, J., concurring).
103. Since Hampton was decided the courts have allowed the due process defense to free a
defendant in an entrapment case in only three of numerous reported federal cases. Compare
United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182
(E.D. Pa. 1980) and United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ark. 1977) with United
States v. McQuin, 612 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 995 (1980); United States v. Till,
609 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 995 (1980); United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d
1008 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hodge, 594 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Corcione, 592 F.2d IIl (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979); United States v. Szycher, 585
F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1978); Cross v. State, 581 F.2d 102 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Prairie, 572
F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Thomas, 567 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
822 (1978); United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d-
244 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978); United States v. Garcia, 562 F.2d 411 (7th
Cir. 1977); United States v. Walker, 559 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Graves, 556
F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); United States v. Steinberg, 551 F.2d
510 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436
U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Puma, 548 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. McClure,
546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Ryan, 548 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
939 (1976); United States v. Sanford, 547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir.), rey'don other grounds, 429 U.S. 14
(1976); United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976); Ainsworth v. Reed, 542 F.2d 243 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 917 (1977); United States v. Gonzales, 539 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir.
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In People v. Isaacson 1o the New York state police used an informant
(Breniman) to purchase drugs from the defendant, a Pennsylvania resi-
dent. The police, after physically abusing and tricking the informant
1976); United States v. Robinson, 539 F.2d 1181 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1101 (1977);
United States v. Gonzalez-Benitez, 537 F.2d 1051 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 923 (1976) and
United States v. Reifsteck, 535 F.2d 1030 (8th Cir. 1976).
In United States v. Hastings, 447 F. Supp. 534 (E.D. Ark. 1977), the United States sought dis-
missal of federal indictments for interstate transportation and receipt of stolen goods on the
ground that the local law enforcement tactics in apprehending the defendants were inimical to
fundamental fairness principles of due process. The police used an informer to arrange a sale with
the defendants in which the defendants would purchase "stolen" merchandise from the informer
under police surveillance. Id. at 538-39. The merchandise had been supplied by government
officials and so was not really stolen. The police would then move in and arrest the defendants.
The Department of Justice, with the court's concurrence, saw the defendants as victims of selective
law enforcement. Id. at 540. The police officer heading this operation previously had lost a civil
suit in which the defendants had been opposing parties. Id. at 538. The court characterized these
events as a vendetta against the defendants. The necessary federal element of an interstate nexus
(the merchandise had been "stolen" in Texas and Mississippi and transported to Arkansas) was a
police device, as was the procurement of the contraband necessary for the charges. Id. at 540.
The court found the police conduct egregious and dismissed the indictments. Id.
In United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), the government used an informer, who
had been convicted of illegally manufacturing methamphetamine (speed), to contact an acquain-
tance (Neville) to discuss setting up a laboratory to manufacture speed. Id. at 375. The parties
eventually agreed to set up the laboratory. Neville was responsible for raising capital and arrang-
ing to distribute the speed and the informant was responsible for procuring the equipment, raw
materials, and lab site. Id. The other defendant, Twigg, transported equipment to the lab and ran
errands. Id. at 376. The government provided the informant with most of what he needed, id. at
375-76, and the informant paid for it with money supplied by Neville. Id. at 376. Once the
laboratory was set up the informant was completely in charge of the manufacture of the speed.
Id. at 380-81. The lab operated for a week before the police arrested Neville, while he was driving
from the farm with a suitcase containing speed, and the other defendant, Twigg. Id. at 376.
In neither case did the court specify what made the police conduct so outrageous that it violated
fundamental fairness. The court's concern in Hastings was the motive behind the police opera-
tion. In Twigg the court's primary concern was that the government itself through its informant
had concocted the criminal scheme and then lured the defendant into it. Id. at 380-81. In addi-
tion, the informer was completely in charge of the illegal operation and was the only party with
the laboratory skills necessary to manufacture the methamphetamine. Id. Under these circum-
stances there would seem to be at least a reasonable doubt of the defendants' predisposition to
commit the crime. Because the jury found the defendants were predisposed, however, entrapment
was unavailable as a defense and the only defense the defendants could argue was due process.
It is very possible that the court's finding of a due process violation represents its belief that the
defendants really were not predisposed. Twigg could not raise the entrapment defense because a
defendant who is induced by a non-government official (here Twigg became involved through the
other defendant) to commit a crime cannot argue entrapment. Id. at 381. The entrapment de-
fense is reserved solely for those defendants who have been induced by government agents. See
United States v. Garcia, 546 F.2d 613, 615 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 958 (1977); United
States v. Conversano, 412 F.2d 1143, 1148 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 905 (1969).
104. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
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into believing he faced a long prison term,105 forced him to assist them
in drug investigations. Breniman contacted a number of people he
knew, including the defendant."°s Eventually he got the defendant to
agree to sell him some cocaine. The sale was arranged to take place at
a point near the New York-Pennslyvania border, which the defendant
believed was in Pennslyvania, but was in fact in New York.107 The
defendant devised an elaborate method for delivering the cocaine, 10 8
but was arrested in spite of his precautions and convicted for the sale of
a controlled substance. 109 The court found the defendant predisposed
to commit the crime, but stated that the police conduct was so egre-
gious under due process standards as to require dismissal of the case. 10
The court went beyond merely stating that the police conduct vio-
lated due process and listed the factors to consider in scrutinizing police
conduct."'I The factors the court considered were: (1) Whether the po-
lice manufactured the crime or only took part in ongoing criminal ac-
tivity; (2) whether the police themselves engaged in criminal conduct;
(3) whether the police overcame the defendant's reluctance to commit
the crime with appeals to past friendships, temptation of financial gain
or repeated solicitations; and (4) whether the police had a legitimate
motive for conducting the investigation." 2 None of these was disposi-
tive for the court. All four are relevant, however, in the context of such
105. 44 N.Y.2d at 514-15, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. The police kicked the in-
formant and threatened to shoot him. They also led him to believe that the drug charges would
result in a stiff prison term. In fact, the police had already analyzed the capsules in the inform-
ant's possession and found them to be only caffeine.
106. 44 N.Y.2d at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716.
107. 44 N.Y.2d at 517, 378 N.E.2d at 80-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716-17. The New York police
wanted the sale to take place in New York where they had jurisdiction to make an arrest. The
defendant feared the stiff New York drug penalties and wanted the sale to occur in Pennsylvania.
During the course of negotiations the place for the sale was moved progressively north until the
final place was a spot near the New York-Pennsylvania border.
108. 44 N.Y.2d at 518, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717. The scheme involved having a
third party drive along in a separate car with the cocaine and the defendant carrying a plastic bag
containing a nonnarcotic substance in case of a "rip-off."
109. Id.
110. 44 N.Y.2d at 518-19, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
111. The court stated:
While due process is a flexible doctrine, certain types of police action manifest a disre-
gard for cherished principles of law and order. Upon an inquiry to determine whether
due process principles have been transgressed in a particular factual frame there is no
precise line of demarcation.... All components of the complained of conduct must be
scrutinized but certain aspects of the action are likely to be indicative.
Id. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719 (citations omitted).
112. Id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
law enforcement objectives as the prevention of crime and the appre-
hension of criminals. 11 The court found that all four factors had been
met'1 4 and that, taken as a whole, they revealed "a brazen and continu-
ing pattern in disregard of fundamental rights."' 1
5
It is true that the Supreme Court has left no doubt that the primary
focus in entrapment cases is on the defendant's predisposition) 16
Isaacson shows, however, that it is possible to focus on the police con-
duct as long as there are standards to determine when to focus on and
how to measure the police conduct. Insofar as Isaacson has tried to
incorporate these two strands into an entrapment case, it has shown
that a dual approach can achieve a proper result in a logical and sound
manner.
III. THE VIABILITY OF A DUAL APPROACH TO ENTRAPMENT CASES
The defendant's predisposition should control the availability of the
traditional subjective entrapment defense." 7 If the defendant was not
predisposed, entrapment will be his defense. It is only when the de-
fendant was predisposed that the due process defense is needed. The
due process defense, like the objective approach to entrapment, focuses
on police conduct. Adoption of the objective approach makes develop-
ment of the due process defense unnecessary. It effectively deals with
the same problem the due process defense meets and avoids the vague-
ness inherent in due process cases."" Dealing with the problem of
overreaching police conduct outside the entrapment defense is justifia-
ble only if some need for retaining the subjective approach to entrap-
ment exists.
Courts have developed a variety of rationales to justify their particu-
lar view of entrapment, 1 9 but the undeniable fact'2 remains that the
113. Id.
114. The court said (I) was met because there was police manufacture and creation of crime;
the abuse of the informant violated (2); the persistent attempts to overcome the defendant's reluc-
tance to sell the cocaine violated (3); and the police concern for getting the defendant into New
York showed an overriding police desire for a conviction in violation of (4). Id. at 522-23, 378
N.E.2d at 83-84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
115. Id. at 523, 378 N.E.2d at 84, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
116. See Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484,488 (1976); id. at 492 n.2 (Powell, J., concur-
ring).
117. See 425 U.S. at 489-90; 411 U.S. at 436.
118. See notes 68, 100 supra and accompanying text.
119. At the federal level Congress has never enacted a statutory formulation of the entrapment




allegedly entrapped defendant knowingly and voluntarily committed a
criminal act. 12 ' He has thus to an extent shown himself to be a danger
to society. The entrapment defense does not disprove the commission
of the crime, it merely implements the commonly held belief that inno-
cent people should not be induced or persuaded to commit criminal
acts. The traditional subjective defense should be available only to the
"unwary innocent" who, but for the police inducement, would not have
committed the criminal act. 122 Because a court acquits a defendant in a
successful entrapment defense, it seems more reasonable to focus the
defense on the defendant rather than on the police conduct.' 23 The
(1973). The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress is free to enact legislation concerning
entrapment because the defense is not a constitutional one. "Since the defense is not of a constitu-
tional dimension, Congress may address itself to the question and adopt any substantive definition
of the defense that it may find desirable." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 433 (1973). In
the absence of any statutory formulation, federal courts are bound by Supreme Court precedents
on the entrapment defense.
The majority of states have also left the development of the entrapment defense to the courts.
Most state courts have followed the lead of the Supreme Court and adopted the subjective ap-
proach. See text accompanying note 8 supra. A minority of states have adopted the objective
approach. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. In a few instances, however, states have
enacted legislation recognizing an express statutory entrapment defense. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1-709 (1973) (subjective approach); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-05-11 (1973)
(objective approach); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(1) (1973) (subjective approach); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 9A.16.070 (1975) (subjective approach). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
120. Most courts require the defendant to admit the commission of the offense before pleading
entrapment. See United States v. Caron, 588 F.2d 851, 852 (1st Cir. 1978); Tzimopoulos v. United
States, 554 F.2d 1216, 1217 n.1 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977); United States v. Russo,
540 F.2d 1152, 1154 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976). Contra, United States v.
Demma, 523 F.2d 981, 982 (9th Cir. 1975).
121. See note 10 supra. The defendant's defense in entrapment cases is that there is an ele-
ment missing from the offense. The defendant often concedes and in many courts is required to
concede that he in fact did commit the criminal act charged. See note 120 supra and accompany-
ing text. He then argues that he lacked the requisite criminal intent to commit the crime. That
intent, ordinarily inferable from the admitted act, is absent because the defendant claims the po-
lice induced him to commit the criminal act and that he would not have committed it without the
inducement.
122. See note 6 supra. The view that the entrapped defendant is an "innocent person" is part
of the subjective approach to entrapment and has been expressed in Supreme Court majority
opinions since Sorrells. The entrapment defense prohibits the police from inducing criminal acts
by persons "otherwise innocent in order to lure them to [their] commission and to punish them."
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435,448 (1932). In Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372
(1958), the Court stated that "[t]o determine whether entrapment has been established, a line must
be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal."
123. There are, of course, areas of criminal law where the courts do focus on the police con-
duct. Courts apply the exclusionary rule to evidence gathered in illegal searches and seizures in
violation of the fourth amendment, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657-60 (1961); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914), as well as to coerced confessions in violation of the fifth
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defendant voluntarily endangered society. 124
Most commentators on the entrapment defense prefer an objective
approach.125 One reason for this preference is a belief that an objective
approach is necessary to preserve the purity of the administration of
justice. 26 This approach may be aesthetically appealing, but if, as it
appears, the Justices using this rationale are concerned with public re-
spect for the criminal justice system, an objective approach is improper.
Public outrage is a highly unlikely response to the conviction of de-
fendants predisposed to commit a crime unless outrageous police con-
duct is involved. 27 It is more likely that the public would lose respect
for a judicial system that allows predisposed defendants to go free
merely because the police exceeded the limits of what would induce a
hypothetical person to commit the crime. 128
A second and more defensible rationale for the objective approach is
supervision of law enforcement practices. 29 This view requires the ar-
amendment, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,471-74 (1966). The entrapment defense is very
different from these exclusionary rules, however, because a successful entrapment defense results
in the acquittal of a defendant who committed the acts constituting the crime for which he was
charged, while the exclusionary rule results only in the exclusion of the tainted evidence at the
trial.
124. The police conduct, if it is sufficiently outrageous, could also pose a threat to society.
When the police themselves engage in criminal acts Justice Rehnquist has indicated the police will
be liable to prosecution. "If the police engage in illegal activity in concert with a defendant be-
yond the scope of their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in
prosecuting the police under the applicable provisions of state or federal law." 425 U.S. at 490. If
the police conduct did not warrant prosecuting the police, but was still outrageous, the due process
defense would be available to the defendant. See note 79 supra and notes 136-37 infra and ac-
companying text. Because a successful due process defense results in the acquittal of the defend-
ant, the availability of such a defense would help curb excessive police conduct.
125. See, eg., L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 265-72
(1967); Donnelly, supra note 1, at 1091; Murchison, The Entrapment Defense in Federal Courts:
Modern Developments, 47 Miss. L.J. 573 (1976); Comment, Entrapment Predisposition of Defend-
ant CrucialFactor in Entrapment Defense, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 546 (1974); Comment The Viability
of the Entrapment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IowA L. REV. 655 (1974); Comment,
Entrapment: A Critical Discussion, 37 Mo. L. REV. 633 (1972). But cf. Defeo, Entrapment as a
Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its History, Theory and Application, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV.
243 (1967) (supporting the subjective approach); Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L.
REV. 163 (1976) (supporting a modified version of the subjective approach); Note, Entrapment, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1332 (1960) (supporting a modified version of the subjective approach).
126. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 384 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result).
127. See Park, supra note 125, at 224.
128. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. See also Park, supra note 125, at 224-25.
129. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369,385 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the
result); Batson v. State, 568 P.2d 973, 975 (Alaska 1977); People v. Moran, I Cal. 3d 755, 766, 463
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ticulation of explicit standards as practical guidelines for police investi-
gating crimes. The present formulations of the objective view of
entrapment provide little guidance for the police.1 3 They merely tell
the police not to offer inducements that would lead a law-abiding, hy-
pothetical person to commit a crime.
Establishing clear and detailed procedures for the variable situations
police encounter in investigating and detecting crime is much more dif-
ficult than establishing such rules in confession cases.13 1 In confession
cases constitutional rights are involved, and it is easier to establish rigid
rules because all defendants may be treated in a similar fashion. 32 In
entrapment cases in which crimes are usually consensual133 and diffi-
cult to detect, the situations in which the police find themselves and
the techniques they must employ vary greatly. This variety militates
against establishing hard and fast rules. 34
P.2d 763, 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. 411, 417 (1970) (Traynor, C.J., dissenting). Judge Traynor stated in
Moran:
A jury verdict of guilty or not guilty tells the police nothing about the jury's evaluation
of the police conduct. . . .Moreover, even when the verdict settles the issue of entrap-
ment in the particular case, it "cannot give significant guidance for official conduct for
the future. Only the court, through the gradual evolution of explicit standards in accu-
mulated precedents, can do this with the degree of certainty that wise administration of
criminal justice demands."
I Cal. 3d at 766, 463 P.2d at 769, 83 Cal. Rptr. at 417 (quoting 356 U.S. at 385 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring in the result)). Accord, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
130. See notes 9, 128 supra and accompanying text. The objective approach cases show little
attempt to develop the explicit rules that the police need. People v. Turner, 390 Mich. 7, 210
N.W.2d 336 (1973) involved a situation in which a government informer became friendly with the
defendant over a three year period. The informer invented a story of a drug-addicted girlfriend to
play on the defendant's sympathy as a friend. The court, without setting out any rules, stated that
under these facts there had been entrapment as a matter of law. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226
(Alaska 1969) and State v. Mullen, 216 N.W.2d 375 (Iowa 1974) tried to be more explicit. "De-
pending on an evaluation of the facts in each case, prohibited governmental activity might include
extreme pleas of desperate illness, appeals based primarily on sympathy, pity or close personal
friendship, and offers ofinordinate sums of money." 216 N.W.2d at 383 (emphasis added). Gross-
man contained a similar passage. 457 P.2d at 230.
131. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
132. Park, supra note 125, at 227.
133. See note I supra.
134. See note 100 supra. This is especially true in narcotics cases that involve different crimes
for possessing, dealing, and manufacturing the drugs. A court might find that when the police
persistently suggested a drug sale and then arrested the party for possession, there was overreach-
ing police conduct despite the predisposition of the accused. Persistent solicitations and supply of
necessary ingredients, however, might not be overreaching conduct when the police were investi-
gating a drug-manufacture operation. The difference in the two situations is in the danger the
parties pose to society. Presumably, the greater that danger, the more active the police conduct
that would be allowed.
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Notwithstanding the difficulty of the task, some guidelines to curb
excessive police conduct are necessary. A dual approach to entrapment
cases 135 that places the primary focus on the defendant, but allows a
focus on the police conduct under a due process rationale, is an effec-
tive method of meeting that need. 136  Because the due process aspect
addresses the outrageousness of the police conduct in general, 137 as op-
posed to developing rules to guide specific aspects of police undercover
work, it should be easier to develop standards to evaluate that conduct.
The due process standards would apply to all situations involving en-
trapment cases. Thus they would not encounter the problem of the ob-
jective approach in trying to fit specific rules to particular situations.' 38
They will instead be generalized standards applicable to the variable
situations in which the police find themselves.
One of the factors comprising the due process standards is the police
knowledge of the dangerousness of the persons with whom they are
dealing. If the police know that a particular person is violent, the risk
that others might be injured during the course of the criminal acts al-
135. See text accompanying notes 78-79 supra.
136. Another doctrine some courts use to control police conduct is "reasonable suspicion." In
Childs v. United States, 267 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cerl. denied, 359 U.S. 948 (1959), the D.C.
Circuit affirmed a conviction for the controlled sale of narcotics despite a lack of probable cause to
believe the defendant was predisposed. In dicta the court stated that "reasonable suspicion" was
sufficient. Id. at 620. The military courts allow a claim of entrapment to be defeated by a show-
ing that the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion that the party was engaged in the commis-
sion of a crime or was about to do so. United States v. McGlenn, 8 C.M.A. 286, 24 C.M.R. 96
(1957). Accord, United States v. Suter, 21 C.M.A. 510,45 C.M.R. 284 (1972). In Walker v. State,
255 Ind. 65, 262 N.E.2d 641 (1970), the Indiana Supreme Court held that by pleading entrapment
the defendant imposed on the prosecution the requirement of proving that it had probable cause
of suspecting the defendant was engaged in illegal conduct. Id. at 71, 262 N.E.2d at 645. Since
Walker, the Indiana Supreme Court has recognized that under the subjective approach it is im-
material whether the police have any reason to suspect the defendant and, accordingly, overruled
Walker in Hardin v. State, 265 Ind. 635, 358 N.E.2d 134 (1976). The doctrine of "reasonable
suspicion" also seems to be losing ground in the federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Swets,
563 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978), in which the court held that the
government did not need to show it had reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was
engaged in unlawful activities.
137. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
138. See note 134 supra and accompanying text. Although the standards would apply in all
situations, they would be flexible enough to allow the police more or less leeway depending on the
particular facts and circumstances of the situation. Once the defendant raises the due process
defense, the trial judge, not the jury, makes the determination if fundamental fairness has been
violated. See United States v. Johnson, 565 F.2d 179, 181 (Ist Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1075 (1978); United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 648 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gonzalez,
539 F.2d 1238, 1240 n.1 (9th Cir. 1976).
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lowed, outweighs the benefit of gathering the evidence needed to gain a
conviction. For example, the risk that innocent bystanders might be
hurt is too great to allow the police to set up an undercover drug
purchase in a public place with a person known to carry and use weap-
ons. The greater the danger of injury to others, the less the police
should be allowed to arrange controlled crimes.
A second factor is the point in the criminal act in which the police get
involved. If the police involve themselves in an ongoing crime, it is
clear that the suspects already intended to commit the crime and had
devised a plan upon which they had already embarked. The police
merely go along with what had been started, perhaps helping out when
necessary,13 9 and thus gather the evidence needed to convict. If the
police become involved at the outset, however, there is a greater danger
the crime can move beyond the planning stage and actually be commit-
ted. People sometimes intend to commit crimes, but are unable to de-
vise adequate plans or obtain necessary equipment. When the police
become involved at the outset, there is always the danger they will pro-
vide the means for the crime that the suspects might not have been able
to provide by themselves. Thus, there is a greater chance a crime will
be committed that would not have otherwise occurred if the police had
become involved at the outset rather than at a later stage.
The final factor is the type of police involvement in the undercover
operation. Hampton indicated that the police can engage in some un-
lawful activities (e.g., supply of contraband) that will not be a defense
to the prosecution." It is not clear, however, how far the police may
go. '4 If, for example, the police committed a murder, this would cer-
139. See 411 U.S. at 431.
140. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
141. The recent Abscam cases are good examples of the concern courts have for undercover
police investigations. In the Abscam investigation the police posed as Arab sheiks attempting to
gain influence in the United States by offering sums of money to government officials including
congressmen. The police videotaped many of the money transactions. The videotapes have
shown a marked lack of reluctance on the part of the government officials to accept the money.
The care with which the police set up the transactions and the pains they took to ensure they did
not entrap the officials, coupled with the videotapes has, thus far, resulted in five convictions and
only one acquittal.
The acquittal was on the ground that the prosecution had not proven predisposition beyond a
reasonable doubt. United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1200 (E.D. Pa. 1980). As an
alternative ground for acquittal, however, the court stated that the police had violated the due
process rights of the defendants. For the court, when the police initiate bribes, provide generous
financial inducements, and use other incentives amounting to an appeal to civic duty, they violate
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tainly be outrageous police conduct sufficient to violate fundamental
fairness notions of due process. The line separating the acceptable
criminal act of supplying contraband from the unacceptable murder
must be drawn at the point of what is reasonably necessary under the
circumstances for the police to gain the confidence of the suspects with-
out either increasing the risk of harm to innocent bystanders or so in-
volving themselves in criminal activity as to become as culpable as the
parties they are investigating.
If the police cannot gain the confidence of their suspects, their inves-
tigation will have little chance of gathering the evidence needed for a
successful prosecution. To gain the suspect's confidence, the police
often will have to show a readiness to become involved in the very
criminal activity they seek ultimately to stop. The extent to which the
police may engage in criminal activity, however, must be limited by the
need underlying undercover investigations. Such investigations are
needed to gather evidence to prosecute certain crimes and ultimately to
control such crimes.'42 If the police engage in criminal conduct that
shows a disregard for the safety of bystanders or makes them as blame-
worthy as the suspects they are investigating, they pose at least as great
a danger to society as those suspects. It is at this point that criminal
police activity must be stopped. These factors should be considered
under a "totality of the circumstances" approach to see if in a particu-
lar situation due process has been violated.
Adoption of such standards by the Supreme Court 4 3 will help to
provide consistency to the limits of permissible police conduct. Be-
cause the standards will develop within the framework of the due proc-
ess clause, they will apply to both federal courts and to the states
through the operation of the fourteenth amendment. The police will
retain a great deal of leeway in the undercover investigations that are
an integral part of detecting and prosecuting consensual crimes,44 and
the public will be safeguarded from an excessive, overzealous police
force.
due process. Id. at 1204. The court, however, did not develop any explicit standards for a due
process violation.
142. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 81 supra.





The Supreme Court in Hampton left the entrapment doctrine in a
confused, untenable state.' 45 Five Justices retain the subjective focus to
entrapment,' 4 and five Justices would allow a non-entrapment due
process defense that would focus on the outrageousness of the police
conduct.'4 7 The Justices allowing the due process defense are further
split into two groups who would each allow different levels of police
conduct to fall within the category of "outrageous."' 148
Explicitly adopting a dual approach to entrapment cases would help
alleviate the confusion. Retaining the subjective approach to entrap-
ment would keep the focus on the defendant. 49 Allowing a due proc-
ess defense that focuses on the police conduct would help eliminate
145. See notes 72-73 supra and accompanying text. One court has remarked that "[t]he debate
over whether to use a subjective or an objective test of entrapment has failed to produce workable
guidelines and has led to sixty years of confusion." State v. Paiz, 91 N.M. 5, 6, 569 P.2d 415, 416
(CL App. 1977).
146. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
147. See note 73 supra and accompanying text.
148. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text.
149. Because the subjective view allows evidence of criminal reputation and past criminal
conduct, there is a danger of prejudice. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying text. Most
proponents of the objective view have been quick to point out this danger. See Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958):
The danger of prejudice in such a situation, particularly if the issue of entrapment must
be submitted to the jury and disposed of by a general verdict of guilty or innocent, is
evident. The defendant must either forego the claim of entrapment or run the substan-
tial risk that, in spite of instructions, the jury will allow a criminal record or bad reputa-
tion to weigh in its determination of guilt of the specific offense of which he stands
charged.
Id. at 382. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), Justice Stewart said:
[A] test that makes the entrapment defense depend on whether the defendant had the
requisite predisposition permits the introduction into evidence of all kinds of hearsay,
suspicion, and rumor--all of which would be inadmissible in any other context-in or-
der to prove the defendant's predisposition. . . .This sort of evidence is not only unreli-
able, as the hearsay rule recognizes; but it is also highly prejudicial, especially if the
matter is submitted to the jury, for, despite instructions to the contrary, the jury may well
consider such evidence as probative not simply of the defendant's predisposition, but of
his guilt of the offense with which he stands charged.
Id. at 443. (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Mikell, The Doctrine of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 90 U. PA. L. REv. 245 (1942); Williams, The Defense ofEntrapment and Related Problems
in Criminal Prosecution, 28 FoRDHAM L. REV. 399 (1959); Comment, The Viability of the Entrap-
ment Defense in the Constitutional Context, 59 IowA L. REv. 655 (1974); Note, The Defense of
Entrapment: .4 Pleafor Constitutional Standards, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 63 (1967).
The danger in admitting this prejudicial testimony into evidence is that the trier of fact will
convict the defendant for past offenses instead of the offense for which he is on trial. The answer
to this possibility of prejudice, however, does not lie in excluding the evidence. It lies in properly
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overreaching police conduct, once standards are determined. 5 The
Supreme Court, by explicitly adopting a dual approach and delineating
the necessary standards, would go a long way toward developing the
clear and cogent view of entrapment that has been lacking since the
defense was first recognized.
Jeffrey N. Klar
limiting the scope of the evidence and instructing the jury of the limited purpose of the evidence -
the evidence can be used only to show predisposition.
Because there are conflicting interests here--the probative value of evidence of predisposition to
show criminal intent against the probative danger of unfairly prejudicing the defendant-a rea-
sonable solution would balance the competing interests. The trial judge could have the discretion
to balance the interests in light of the actual need for the evidence of other crimes or reputation,
the similarity of the other crimes to the charged crime, the availability of other, less prejudiced,
evidence, the availability of limiting instructions to thejury, and the possibility the jury will have
been so prejudiced as to disregard those instructions. In this way the danger to the defendant
would be diminished and the prosecution would be allowed to prove the allegedly missing ele-
ment of the crime.
A trial judge's balancing to determine admissibility of other crimes or reputation evidence is
certainly not a novel notion. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for such balancing. Rule 403
provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EvID. 403.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 403 states that "[s]ituations in this area call for balanc-
ing the probative value of and need for the evidence against the harm likely to result from its
admission." Thus the relevance of other-crimes evidence or reputation is always to be balanced
against its prejudicial effect in the process of determining admissibility. Rule 404(b) deals specifi-
cally with evidence of other crimes:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Because the other-crime evidence would be used to show predisposition it would come within the
exception to the inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes.
150. See notes 135-44 supra and accompanying text.
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